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Abstract
Auctions have been a popular way of transaction on the Internet. Most of the studies of
auction assume participants attending the auction are homogeneous. However, this
assumption is open to question. In fact, every participant has his own personality, risk
attitude, behavior, and cost when attending online auctions. This study takes an empirical
approach and uses four variables, time of entry, time of exit, number of bids, and number of
jump bids, to find the heterogeneity among bidders. We first used k-means clustering method
to identify the types of bidders of online auctions, and then used C5.0 decision tree learning
algorithm to find the rules to differentiate bidders. A taxonomy of four types of bidders is
proposed in the study, which include observers, adventurers, opportunists, and early players.
The results also suggest pacing of the auctions is an important factor that will affect bidder’s
behavior in online auctions.
Key Words: Online auction, bidding behavior, K-means clustering method, C5.0 decision
tree algorithm

1. Introduction
For the Internet has lowered the cost of a bidder to participate in an auction, auction has been
a usual way of transaction on the Internet. Online auctions possess some unique properties
compared with traditional auctions, which cause their growing popularity. First, the bidder
can stay anywhere to participate in the auction instead of having to come to the auction
house. Second, online auctions can last for several days, which gives sellers and bidders more
flexibility. Third, search engines and clickable hierarchies of categories for browsing make
bidders find what they want more easily. Therefore, online auctions are more efficient, less
expensive, and easily accessible to buyers.
Most of the previous researches on auction are based on an assumption that all of the
participants attending online auctions are homogenous, they are rational and will bid
strategically to achieve their best benefits. However, this assumption is open to question for
online auction. Because of the low cost of attending an online auction, more variety of
participants will be attracted. For testing the homogeneity between bidders, Bapna et al.
(2004) conducted an inductive study to develop a bidder taxonomy challenges the notion that
one can build a theory by assuming a single bidder type. They found that bidders pursue
different bidding strategies resulting in different winning likelihoods and consumer surplus.
Based on Bapna’s taxonomy model, this study used k-means clustering methods to find the
heterogeneity among bidders. A new variable, number of jump bidding, was added in the
model to the completely consider the special strategies in online auction. After that, we used
a decision tree learning method to build the rules that can discriminate between types of
bidders. This taxonomy not only assists us in finding out different kinds of bidding behaviors,
but also helps us explain the divergence among these bidding behaviors. Finally, because the
length of an auction is a major distinctive feature of online auction and may affect behaviors

The Tenth Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems (PACIS 2006)

of online bidding, we also compared types of bidders in auctions with different length to
explore the impacts of time on bidders’ behavior.

2. Theoretical Background
An auction is “a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining resource
allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the market participants” (McAfee et al. 1987).
Such mechanism sets out rules for bidding and allocates the goods to a certain bidder based
on the predefined rule set (Klein 1997). There are various mechanisms for auctions, such as
ascending or descending bidding, valuation revealed of not, bids updated once or more.
However, English auction is the dominant mechanism on the Internet (Pinker et al. 2003). In
English auction, once the bidder finds the item she’s interested in, he/she can view the current
high bid, and decide whether to raise it by filling out her own bid amount in a text box in her
Web browser (Lucking-Reiley 2000). English online auction allows bidder interaction and
competition, and suits particularly well periods longer than a few minutes, which means
bidders can bid asynchronously. The designs of online English auction also lead to some
special online bidding behaviors:
Late bidding Late bidding means bidders will not bid until the last few minutes or even
seconds to avoid revealing their preference early. We also call this sniping. Late bidding can
be found in the online auction frequently (Bajari et al. 2004). Roth and Ockenfels (2002)
found in a sample of 240 antique auctions on eBay, 89 had bids in the last minute and 29 in
the last 10 seconds. Bidders bid late for several reasons. First, Ockenfels and Roth (2006)
argued that late bidding may be a form of “tacit collusion” by the bidders against the seller.
Second, by bidding early, a bidder may signal information to other bidders and cause them to
update their beliefs about the common value of the item in a common value auction. This
may increase the price that a bidder has to pay for the item (Bajari et al. 2004). Third, there is
the presence of naïve bidders eBay who do not understand the proxy-bidding mechanism, and
hence bid incrementally in response to competitors’ bids (Ockenfels et al. 2006). The lastminute bidding is a best-response by rational bidders against such naïve bidders. According
the above explanations about late bidding, late bidding seems to be a rational behavior.
However, it is notice that not all of bidders enter online auctions late. Some may enter early,
and place an early bid.
Jump bidding Jump bidding is entering a bid larger than what is necessary to be a currently
winning bidder. Since online auctions have longer duration relative to traditional ones,
bidders have difficulties in monitoring all bidding process to place their pedestrian bids. Any
positive bidding cost can lead to jump bids by bidders choosing to enter, especially early in
the auction, and that the extent of this jump-bidding goes up as expected competition
increases (Ealsey et al. 2004). Besides, jump bidding can signal bidder’s valuation and deter
potential future competition. High-valuing bidders can effectively use jump bidding as a
signal in common-value auctions (Avery 1998).
Shilling Shilling is an attempt by the seller to drive up the price of the good (Lucking-Reiley
2000). Although most auction sites do not allow the seller to submit bids on their own goods,
the seller can register another identity to bid in his/her own auction. One disadvantage of
shilling for the seller is the possibility of overshooting the high bidder’s willingness to pay,
and thus the auction failed.
Researchers often use common assumptions when analyzing bidder behaviors. They suppose
each bidder is homogenous, and may be rational, risk-neutral, knows the value of the subject
to himself clearly, and does not know others valuation. They will bid strategically to achieve
their best benefits. However, the homogeneity assumption can’t explain all the complex
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behaviors listed above and the dynamics of the interactions among bidders in the online
auction well. Because of the low cost of attending an online auction, more variety of
participants will be attracted. Ariely (2003) argued there is a variety of motives for bidders to
participate in the online auction. Johns and Zaichkowsky (2003) also presented some factors
that will influence interactions of users attending auctions and found the outcome of any
auction is dependent upon variety of interbehavior dynamics, which are either intensified or
diminished according to the number of bidders.
Several studies have tried to identify the heterogeneity among bidders. Bapna et al. (2000)
conducted an empirical investigation of multi-unit auctions identifying three distinct types of
bidders. The three types of bidders are evaluators, participators, and opportunists. Evaluators
are early one-time high bidders who have a clear idea of their valuation. They usually bid
higher than the minimum required bid at that time. Participators often make a low initial bid
equal to the minimum required bid and progressively monitor the progress of the auction
making ascending bids never bidding higher than minimum required. They derive some
utilities from the process of participating in the auction itself. Opportunists are bargain
hunters who place minimum required bids just before the auction closes.
Shah et al. (2003) identified common bidding patterns by analyzing data from eBay video
game auctions in a hierarchical process. First, all bidders were separated into single bid
engagements or multiple bid engagements. An engagement is the set of all bids by an
individual bidder in an individual auction. Then Shah et al. use three variables, time from
end, excess increment, and total number of bids, to identify the individual bidder’s behavior.
They revealed that there were four types of bidding behavior which appear frequently in
collected data. The first behavior is evaluating. The bidders bid once, early, and at a high
value. The second is skeptic. The bidders always bid the minimum increment over the current
ask price and submit multiple bids. The third is sniping, which represents the bidders bid in
the closing seconds of the auction. The last behavior is unmasking. The bidder places
multiple bids in a short span of time and at least one bid in the engagement has an excess
increment greater than zero. One possible rationale for this behavior is that the bidder is
trying to expose the maximum bid of someone else’s proxy bid.
Bapna et al. (2004) further demonstrated how the taxonomy of bidder behavior can be used.
The three strategic variables, time of entry, time of exit, number of bids, were chose for
classification on the criteria of being observable, theoretically relevant, and manipulable.
They collected the data from a multi-unit Yankee auction website and identified five bidding
behaviors by a K-means clustering approach. The five bidding behaviors include early
evaluators, middle evaluators, opportunists, sip-and-dippers, and participators. The early
evaluators are the bidders who place just one bid during the early stages of the auction,
possibly reflecting their maximum willingness to pay. The middle evaluators are the bidders
placing one maximum bid in the middle of the auction. The opportunists are late bidders
differing from snipers because of the existence of a going-going-gone period in Yankee
auctions. The sip-and-dippers usually place two bids. One is placed early in the auction to
establish their time priority and perhaps to assess the competition. The participators usually
get into the auction early, and exit lately. They bid throughout the auction representing high
involvement of the auction. Bapna et al. found opportunists and sip-and dippers have
significantly higher winning proportions than the others. However, although time is an
important element that directly affecting bidding process (Johns et al. 2003), Bapna et al.
normalized time of entry and time of exit, and aggregated data for auctions with different
length. The data mining analysis assumed the types of bidders remain unchanged for auctions
with different length.
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3. Research Method
Clustering and classification are two ways to separate bidders from different bidding
behaviors. Classification finds a rule or a formula for organizing data into predefined classes.
Clustering breaks a large database into different subgroups or clusters; it differs from
classification because there are no predefined classes – the clusters are put together on the
basis of similarity to each other, but it is up to the data miners to determine whether the
clusters offer any useful insight. For the purpose of understanding the heterogeneity of
bidders’ behaviors, we conducted a taxonomy of bidder behaviors using the k-means
clustering method as proposed by Bapna et al. (Bapna et al. 2004). Classification analyses
were further conducted to explore the types of bidders we found. Except for the three
variables suggested by Bapna et al., time of entry, time of exit, and number of bids, we added
a new variable, number of jump bidding, to describe bidders’ jump bidding in online auction
and to better explain the characteristics of different types of bidder.
The data were captured from an online auction site, www.go2hk.com, because the details of
each auction are presented in this auction site. The data include the auctions listed in January
to March, 2005, in the category of computer products. All of the auctions collected are
English auctions with fixed ending time. To study the impact of auction listing time, only
records of 7-day and 14-day auction were selected, which are the two highest proportions of
all auctions. Besides, only records of auctions with more than two bids were collected.
Finally, there are 72 auctions which contain 605 bidders. As one bidder may attend more than
1 auction, we viewed this bidder as different bidders. Table 1 presents the profiles of the data
for 7-day and 14-day auctions respectively.
Four variables were used in the clustering analysis. Number of Bids (NOB) was defined as the
total number of bids in placed by an individual bidder in one auction. Time of Entry captures
the bidder’s entry time within an auction. Because what bidders concern is time left until the
auction ends, we measured time of entry by the absolute entry time from the end of the
auction (ENT). Time of Exit captures the bidder’s exit time within an auction and was
measured by the absolute exit time from the end of the auction (EXT). Finally, Jump Bidding
refers to the frequency of entering a bid larger than what is necessary to be a currently
winning bidder. We regarded proxy bidding as a kind of jump bidding although the bidder
don’t have to reveal the price he/she is willing to pay, the bidder has shown the others that
he/she is willing to pay more than the current highest price in proxy bidding. We measured
jump bidding by the number of jump bids (NOJB). The four variables used were defined as
followed:
ENT = the auction’s ending time - a bidder’s first bidding time in the auction (in sec)
EXT = the auction’s ending time - a bidder’s last bidding time in the auction (in sec)
NOB = a bidder’s total bidding numbers in the auction
NOJB = a bidder’s total jump bidding numbers in the auction which include proxy
bidding numbers
Table 1. Number of Bids and Bidders
Number of Bids
Number of Bidders
Number of Bids
Number of Bidders

Day7

Auctions
49

14

23

Mean

Minimum

Maximum

17.183

2

46

7.918
23.608
9.434

2
2
2

21
83
28

Sum
842
388
543
217
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Because the cluster analysis is quite sensitive to differing scales or magnitude among the
variables, the four variables were standardized before applied the k-means algorithm. As
suggested by Milligan and Cooper (1988), because all variables’ minimum value are almost
the same and equal to zero, we used the transformation Z = x/max(X) to standardize these
variables.

4. Clustering analyses
Clustering is a division of data into groups of similar objects (Berkhin 2002). In this study, kmeans algorithm, one of the non-hierarchical methods, was chosen because the pattern of
bidder’s behavior is unknown. In the cluster analysis, multicollinearity between pair of
variables will bias the clusters due to the high correlations between variables. For this reason,
multicollinearity was tested between variables. We regressed Xi on the remaining X’ to obtain
variance inflation factor (VIF), i =1 to 4. We examined multicollinearity for all of the
variables and found all VIFs in both 7-day and 14-day samples are less than 10, which means
there is no multicollinearity between these variables.
Before conducting the k-means algorithm, the number of clusters, k, must be supplied as a
parameter in the analyses. In order to decide “k” properly, we used the kappa coefficients to
find the optimal number of clusters (Brown et al. 2003). First, the data were split into two
parts randomly, S1 and S2. The k-means algorithm was undertaken in S1, for a given number
of clusters. Using the cluster centroids obtained from the initial solution, cases from the S2
were classified according to each solution by their Euclidean distance from the cluster
centroid vectors. Then we did k-means clustering in S2 to extract another solution. The two
solutions were compared by cross-tabulation to determine the chance-corrected of agreement,
kappa, between the corresponding solutions. The optimal number of clusters, “k”, was
decided based on the largest value of kappa. We calculated the Kappa for k =3 to 6 and found
that when k is equal to 4, the kappa is the largest one for both 7-day and 14-day auctions. As
a result, we applied k-means algorithm with the parameter k = 4.
K-means algorithm partitioned the 388 bidders in 7-day auctions into 4 groups, which have
87,13,113, and 175 bidders respectively. Also, k-means algorithm partitioned the 217 bidders
in 14-day auctions into 4 groups, which have 112, 4, 59, and 42 bidders respectively. Table 2
Table 2. Result of clustering – 7-Day auctions
Clus1

N
87

%
22%

Clus2

13

4%

Clus3 113

29%

Clus4 175

45%

Pair
comparison

ENT
4.47a
1.38b
c
(2.41, 7.00)
5.85
1.56
(2.03, 6.97)
0.76
0.75
(0.00, 2.74)
6.31
0.63
(4.45, 7.00)

EXT
1.96
1.45
(0.00, 4.38)
2.46
2.21
(0.00, 5.79)
0.51
0.63
(0.00, 2.11)
6.05
0.78
(3.90, 7.00)

4,2>1>3

4>2,1>3

a: mean; b: standard deviation; c: (minimum, maximum)

NOB
2.16
1.32
(1, 7)
10.92
3.38
(7, 18)
1.80
1.37
(1, 9)
1.77
1.38
(1, 9)

NOJB
0.89
0.93
(0, 4)
6.00
1.68
(4, 9)
0.58
0.69
(0, 3)
0.77
1.08
(0, 5)

2>1,3,4

2>1,4,3
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Table 3. Result of clustering - 14-Day auctions
%

N
Clus1

59

27%

Clus2

4

2%

Clus3

42

19%

Clus4 112

52%

ENT
8.52a
2.56b
c
(4.60, 13.99)
11.39
1.84
(9.54, 13.03)
1.72
2.01
(0.00, 6.06)
12.89
1.17
(9.56, 13.99)

EXT

NOB

NOJB

4.69
2.70
(0.00, 9.12)
11.04
1.86
(8.97, 13.03)
0.66
1.11
(0.00, 3.68)
12.34
1.55
(7.12, 13.99)

3.34
2.86
(1, 13)
14.00
5.94
(9, 22)
1.71
1.24
(1, 6)
1.95
1.57
(1, 7)

1.63
1.93
(0, 10)
2.50
2.08
(0, 5)
0.83
1.06
(0, 6)
0.79
1.26
(0, 7)

and 3 show the results of the cluster analyses. The values present descriptive statistics of the
data in each cluster. For understanding easily, we transferred ENT and EXT from second into
day.
After performing cluster analysis, the validity of the results should be evaluated. A good
clustering must have high intra-cluster similarity and low inter-cluster similarity. As
Aldenderfer and Blashfield (1984) suggested, we examined the null hypothesis that no
significant differences existing among the clusters through ANOVA. The ANOVA tests
rejected the null hypotheses and indicated the four strategic variables, consisting of ENT,
EXT, NOB, and NOJB, differed significantly across clusters. The analyses indicated that the
clustering models have good validity. We also performed post hoc tests for the pair
comparison of clusters. The results are shown in the last row in table 2 and 3. In the 7-day
auctions, the variable ENTs in cluster 4 and 2 are significantly larger than in cluster 1, then
larger than in cluster 3. EXT in cluster 3 is significantly smaller than EXTs in the other
clusters, and EXT in cluster 4 is significantly larger than EXTs in other clusters. As for the
variable NOB and NOJB, the bidders in the cluster 2 placed significantly more bids and jump
bids than the other bidders.
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Pair comparison

4,2>1>3

4,2>1>3

2>1>4,3

1>4

a: mean; b: standard deviation; c: (minimum, maximum)

In the 14-day auctions, results of the pair comparisons of ENT are the same as the results in
7-day auction. Results of the pair comparisons of EXT are also the same as the comparisons
of ENT. NOB in cluster 2 is significantly larger than NOBs in the other clusters, and NOB in
cluster 1 is significantly larger than NOBs in cluster 3 and 4. Finally, NOJB cluster 1 is
significantly larger than NOJB in cluster 4. Although NOJB in cluster is the largest, the
differences are not significant. The characteristics of 4 groups in 14-day auctions are similar
with them in 7-day auctions. We named each cluster of bidders according to their
characteristics of the four parameters. Hence, we identified four types of bidders called early
player, opportunist, adventurer, and observers. Features of the four types of bidders are
shown in the table 4.
Early Player (Cluster 4) This group contains 45% of sample in 7-day auction, which is the
largest group. The bidders in this cluster often enter the auction at the 6.31th day which is
counted from the end of the auction, and exit the auction at the 6.05th day counted from the
end of the auction. Besides, 1.77 bids and 0.77 jump bids are placed averagely in one auction.
In 14-day auction, this group comprises 52% of the sample. The bidders often place bids in
the early phrase of the auction; they often enter the auction at the 12.89th day which is
counted from the end of the auction, and exit the auction at the 12.34th day. Besides, 1.95
bids and 0.79 jump bids are placed averagely in one auction. These bidders often place bids
in the early phrase of the auction, as a result, we call these bidders early players. Only 2 early
players in the samples had won the auction.
Opportunist (Cluster 3) In this cluster the bidders enter the auction very late. This cluster
comprises 29% of the sample in 7-day auction, and 19% in 14-day auction. In 7-day auction,
bidders in this cluster enter the auction at 0.76th day and exit at 0.51th day. 1.8 bids and 0.58
jump bids are placed averagely in one auction. In 14-day auction, bidders in this cluster enter
the auction at 1.72th day and exit at 0.66th day. 1.71 bids and 0.83 jump bids are placed
averagely in one auction. These bidders often place their bids at the time which is close to the
end of the auctions. They enter the auction very late and this may because they want to avoid
bidding wars with incremental bidders or other like-mined bidders. As followed by the
Table 4. Features for observer, adventurer, opportunist, and early player
Cluster1 (Observer)

Cluster2 (Adventurer)

♦ These bidders enter and exit the auction in the
middle stage of the auction.
♦ They often stay a long time during the auction.
♦ They place few bids and jump bids.
♦ The winning likelihood in this cluster is the
second high, less than the opportunists.
Cluster3 (Opportunist)

♦ These bidders enter the auction early, and exit the
auction in the middle stage of the auction.
♦ They often stay a long time during the auction.
♦ The number of bids is very large in this cluster, and
so is jump bid.

♦ The entry time of these bidders is close to the
ending time of the auction.
♦ They are late bidders.
♦ The winning likelihood in this cluster is the
highest among the others.

♦ These bidders often place bids in the early phrase of
the auction.
♦ They place few bids and jump bids.
♦ The often enter the auction early, and exit the
auction early, too.
♦ They stay in the auction for a short period.

Cluster4 (Early Player)
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previous study (Bapna et al. 2004), these bidders are named opportunists. The result of
ANOVA test showed the opportunist has the highest likelihood of winning among all
clusters.
Adventurer (Cluster 2) This cluster is the smallest one. In 7-day auction, the bidders in
cluster 2 enter the auction at the 5.85th day and exit the auction at the 2.46th day. The
number of bids and jump bids are 10.92 and 6. In 14-day auction, the bidders in cluster 2
enter the auction at the 11.39th day and exit the auction at the 11.04th day. The number of
bids and jump bids are 14 and 2.5. These bidders often place more jump bids than the other
groups to deter potential future competition. Consequently, we called these adventurers. But
none of adventurers in our samples had won the auction.
Observers (Cluster 1) This group, which comprises 22% of the in 7-day auction, is most
likely to the cluster 2, adventurers, except for the number of bids and jump bids. They enter
the auction at the 4.47th day of the auction, and exit the auction at the 1.96th day from the
end of the auction. 2.16 bids and 0.89 jump bids are placed averagely in one auction. In the
14-day auction, this group contains 27% of the sample. The bidders enter the auction at the
8.52th day from the end of the auction, and exit the auction at the 4.69th day. 3.34 bids and
1.63 jump bids are placed averagely in one auction. These bidders often place a few bids and
also a few jump bids during the long staying time. This may because these bidders have
lower bidding cost and we named them as the observer. The observer has the second high
winning likelihood among all bidders.

5. Classification analysis
A lack of explanation about the nature of the clusters leaves us responsible for much of the
interpretation about what has been found. Therefore, we also used a supervised data mining
tool, decision trees, to help us gain insight into the nature of the clusters formed by
unsupervised clustering algorithms (Roiger et al. 2003). Decision trees are constructed using
only those attributes best able to differentiate the concepts to be learned. We used the C5.0
algorithm, which is a successor to the well-known decision tree algorithm C4.5 (Quinlan
1993), to find the rules that can discriminate different bidder behaviors properly.
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Table 6. Alternative classification rule for 14-day auctions
Classification rules

Accuracy*
IF ENT > 4.39 day, EXT < 9.12 day, and NOB < 8,
108/112=96.42%
THEN the cluster of the bidder = 1 (Observer)
IF ENT > 4.39 day, EXT < 9.12 day, and NOB > 8,
3/4=75%
THEN the cluster of the bidder = 2 (Adventurer)
IF ENT < 4.39
59/59=100.00%
THEN the cluster of the bidder = 3 (Opportunist)
IF EXT > 9.12 day and ENT >4.39
37/42=88.09%
THEN the cluster of the bidder = 4 (Early Player)
*Accuracy= the number of bidders which can be classified correctly through the
classification rule/ the total number of bidders for each cluster

We randomly split our samples in the 7-day auctions into two groups. Group 1 contains 201
bidders and group 2 includes 187 bidders. We used group 1 to train our model, and used
group 2 to evaluate the model. The result from group 2 shows that 182 (97.33%) bidders were
classified correctly. 217 samples in the 14-day auctions were also randomly split into two
groups. Group1 contains 105 bidders and group2 includes 112 bidders. 103 (91.96%) bidders
in the group 2 were classified correctly. These results indicate our models have high validity
and the classification rules derived can discriminate bidder behaviors effectively, both for
samples of 7-day and 14-day auction. Table 5 summarized the classification rules and the
accuracy for the whole samples in both the 7-day and 14-day auctions.
For comparing the classification rules between 7-day and 14-day auctions, we replaced the
classified variable NOJB in the 14-day auctions with NOB, the same as in the 7-day auctions.
As shown in the table 6, the new rules also resulted in good accuracy and the rules for the 14day auctions are similar with the rules for the 7-day auctions. In the 7-day auctions, the
opportunist will not enter the auction or place his first bid until the auction has processed
about 67.14% of the total time. In 14-day auction sample the opportunist will not appear until
Table 5. Classification rules for bidders’ behavior
Classification rules

Accuracy*

7- day auctions
IF ENT < 2.3 day,
111/113=98.23%
THEN the cluster of the bidder = 3 (Opportunist)
IF ENT > 2.3 day and EXT >4.37 day,
168/175=96%
THEN the cluster of the bidder = 4 (Early Player)
IF ENT > 2.3 day, EXT <4.37 day, and NOB< 6,
86/87=98.85%
THEN the cluster of the bidder = 1 (Observer)
IF ENT > 2.3 day, EXT <4.37 day, and NOB> 6,
10/13=76.92%
THEN the cluster of the bidder = 2 (Adventurer)
14-day auctions
IF ENT > 4.39 day, EXT < 9.12 day, and NOJB < 3,
107/112=95.53%
THEN the cluster of the bidder = 1 (Observer)
IF ENT > 4.39 day, EXT < 9.12 day, and NOJB >3,
3/4=75%
THEN the cluster of the bidder = 2 (Adventurer)
IF ENT < 4.39 day,
57/59=96.61%
THEN the cluster of the bidder = 3 (Opportunist)
IF EXT > 9.12 day and ENT > 4.39
37/42=88.09%
THEN the cluster of the bidder = 4 (Early Player)
*Accuracy= the number of bidders which can be classified correctly through the
classification rule/ the total number of bidders for each cluster
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EXT*
End = 1

Adventurer
Opportuni
NOB > 6 for 7-day
t
auctions
Observer
NOB < 6 for 7-day
auctions
1/3
Early
Pl
Begin

2/3

ENT*
End = 1

* ENT and EXT are reversed and count from the
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Figure 1. The classification of four clusters
the auction has processed about 68.64% of the total time. On the other hand, the early player
in the 7-day auctions will exit the auction before about 37.57% of the total time has passed,
and in the 14-day auctions, will also exit the auction before about 34.86% of the time of
auction has passed. We further simplified the models by replacing the criteria of ENT and
EXT with 1/3 and 2/3 of the total time. Figure 1 shows the rules of the classification of the
four clusters. Opportunists are bidders who don’t enter the auction until 2/3 of the total
auction time has passed. Early players are bidders who will leave the auction before 1/3 of
the auction time has passed. For those bidders who will enter before 2/3 of the total auction
time and leave after 1/3 of the time, adventurers are bidders who bid more than 6 times in 7day auctions, and more than 8 times in 14-day auctions, and observers are bidders who bid
less than 6 times in 7-day auctions, and less than 8 times in 14-day auctions. The new rules
also resulted in good validity of classification.

6. Conclusions
In this study, we first used the k-means clustering method to classify online bidders according
to their bidding behavior. Then we used the C5.0 decision tree learning algorithm to generate
the classification rules that can differentiate different types of bidders and to make us
understand how these bidders behave easily. The taxonomy identifies four distinct bidding
behaviors, which includes observers, adventurers, opportunists, and early players. The
ANOVA tests verified that significant differences exist among these bidders. The sample size
of 72 auctions in this study is somewhat small. Although the unit of analysis is actually
bidders and the samples contain 605 bidders, the analyses resulted in some clusters with only
a few bidders. So the characteristics of these clusters may not be correctly revealed.
However, similar results were obtained both in the samples of 7-day auction and 14-day
auction, further confirmed the validated of our model. Several findings of this study should
be noticed.
First, the classification rules can be simplified as the one third rules as we proposed. This
result suggests the pacing of the auction can affect bidding behavior in online auction. As the
pacing theory proposed by Gersick that suggests a major transition occurs in a work team
while the project has passed half of its time (Gersick 1988; 1989), this study also found
something might happen in bidders’ mind while one third and two thirds of the auction time
have passed. Probably attracted by the low price of the item and the bidding appears easy and
risk free (Ariely et al. 2003), early players will enter the auction in the first period but will
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leave before one third of the auction has passed. The proportion of the early player is the
greatest among all groups. On the other hand, opportunists will not enter the auction until two
third of the auction time have passed. The reasons behind this phenomenon should be
examined further in the future.
Second, the opportunists who enter the auction in the last one third period are similar with the
snipers who bid late to protect their private information or to avoid competition. However,
previous studies about late bidding observed the late bidding by examining the last bidding
time of each bidder (Roth et al. 2002), and in our study, we observed the late bidding
referring to each bidder’s first bid. This criterion is more consistent with the reasons of late
bidding been proposed. According to our narrow definition, late bidding is less severe and
bidders are more varied than in the previous perspective.
Finally, although we added a bidder’s total jump bid number in the model as a classifying
variable, it was not used in the final classification rules. The number of jump bid seem to be
related to the number of bid and their explanation power seem to be duplicated. Observers are
bidders who stay long but with few times of both bidding and jump-bidding. On the other
hand, Adventurers will both bid and jump bid many times in the auction. Therefore, high
bidding cost can’t explain jump-bidding well because those bidders will bid many times in
the auction (Ealsey et al. 2004). Although it is also suggested the purpose of jump bidding is
to show his/her will and to deter competition (Avery 1998), this study found that none
adventurer had won the auction. Raising the auction price seems to be the only reasonable
cause of adventurers.
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